If logged in as an administrator of any WordPress blog on a WordPress multisite, you can extract all values in the database, including password hashes and user activation tokens.
This is achieved by a SQL injection, based on the fact that some of the configuration options are appended into a SQL query in a unsafe way.
The configuration page contains the following code, that allows the user to set the option relevanssi_post_type_weights
to any value:
function update_relevanssi_options() {
....
foreach ($_REQUEST as $key => $value) {
if (substr($key, 0, strlen('relevanssi_weight_')) == 'relevanssi_weight_') {
$type = substr($key, strlen('relevanssi_weight_'));
$post_type_weights[$type] = $value;
}
....
}
if (count($post_type_weights) > 0) {
update_option('relevanssi_post_type_weights', $post_type_weights);
}
....
}
Now when a search is made, the function relevanssi_search
is called, this appends the user-controlled value into the SQL query:
$post_type_weights = get_option('relevanssi_post_type_weights');
...
!empty($post_type_weights['post_tag']) ? $tag = $post_type_weights['post_tag'] : $tag = $relevanssi_variables['post_type_weight_defaults']['post_tag'];
!empty($post_type_weights['category']) ? $cat = $post_type_weights['category'] : $cat = $relevanssi_variables['post_type_weight_defaults']['category'];
$query = "SELECT relevanssi.*, relevanssi.title * $title_boost +
relevanssi.content + relevanssi.comment * $comment_boost +
relevanssi.tag * $tag + relevanssi.link * $link_boost +
relevanssi.author + relevanssi.category * $cat + relevanssi.excerpt +
relevanssi.taxonomy + relevanssi.customfield + relevanssi.mysqlcolumn AS tf
FROM $relevanssi_table AS relevanssi $query_join
WHERE $term_cond $query_restrictions";
/?s=test
Note: while it’s possible to inject syntax errors, it’s currently unknown whether this bug can be used to inject anything that would be useful to an attacker.
Upgrade to version 3.6.1 or later.